We compare two contest. Decentralized in which there are several independent contests with non overlapping contestants and Centralized in which all contestants …ght for a unique prize which is the sum of all prizes in the small contests. We study the relationship between payo¤s and e¤orts between these two contests.
Introduction
Is it better to gather all rent-seeking activities in one place, say Washington D.C. or Brussels, available to all citizens, rather than having them scattered all over US/EU and available only to the local people? Shall research funds for, say, economics be allocated in a single large contest available to all or shall they be allocated in several small contests only available to the local people?
These kind of questions arise again and again and they involve issues of e¢ ciency and fairness.
In this note we concentrate on an important aspect of the problem namely equilibrium payo¤s and e¤orts spent by the contestants. E¤ort is sometimes socially valuable, such as when it is a proxy of the quality of the job to be done by the contest winner, or is sometimes a waste from the social welfare perspective, like rent seeking e¤orts aiming at a monopoly franchise. The e¤ect on e¤ort of passing from a large contest to a several small ones is not obvious. On the one hand the small contest has less competitors so individual e¤orts must increase. But on the other hand the prize is now smaller which calls for less e¤ort.
In this note, we characterize the relationship of e¤orts in decentralized and in centralized contests assuming the Contest Success Function (CSF) proposed by Beviá and Corchón (2015) which generalizes Tullock CSF. We also …nd necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the contestants or the contest organizer to prefer centralized or decentralized contests.
The only paper dealing with this problem is by Wärneryd (2001) . He assumes a generalized Tullock CSF and identical agents. Only our result on aggregate e¤ort (Proposition 2) is comparable to the results obtained by him, see footnote 4.
The model
In a contest, m agents called contestants spend e¤orts (bids) denoted by G i in order to win a prize of value V i . We consider two type of contests.
-Decentralized (D) k independent identical contests with n contestants each (thus m = n) and a prize valued as V i , i = 1; 2; :::; n.
-Centralized (C) A single contest which is the aggregation of k identical contests. There are kn agents (thus m = kn) and a single prize valued as kV i , i = 1; 2; :::; kn. 1 1 We assume that the value of the prize in C is just the sum of the k prizes in D.
A Contest Success Function (CSF) maps e¤orts of the agents into the probability that they will obtain the prize (or her share of the prize). Let G = (G 1 ; :::; G m ): In a previous paper we introduced the idea of a notional CSF which maps G into real numbers (Beviá and Corchón (2015) ).
We proposed the following notional CSF:
This (notional) CSF mixes proportional CSF (Tullock (1980) ) and (relative) di¤erence CSF (Hirshleifer (1989), Baik (1998) and Che and Gale (2000)). To convert this notional CSF into a CSF we …rst need that P m j=1 f i (G) = 1. This is accomplished by the following condition:
When s = = 0, = 1 we have the Tullock CSF and f ( ) is non negative. When s 6 = 0 or 6 = 0 non negativity is achieved when m = 2 by introducing max min operators as in Che and Gale (2000) or for general m by introducing a rationing rule which mimics the working of the CSF, see Beviá and Corchón (2015) for details. We show that in equilibrium there is no rationing so we leave the details of the rationing scheme to the interested reader. Let h( ) the CSF derived from (2.1) and (2.2) by taking into account that the range of such a function must yield probabilities.
Consider a game in which strategies are expenses and payo¤ functions are
To simplify the presentation, we focus on Nash equilibria in pure strategies in which all players exert a positive e¤ort, which is guaranteed if: 
Note that (2.7) implies (2.6) so we will only use the former.
To prove the existence of a Nash Equilibrium, we need the following assumption. 
In Beviá and Corchón (2015) we proved the following: Lemma 1. Under (2.5) and (2.8) there is a Nash Equilibrium (G i ) n i=1 such that:
We proved Lemma 1 in Beviá and Corchón (2015) by constructing an auxiliary game in which payo¤ functions are f i (G)V i G i . This game has a unique Nash equilibrium characterized by …rst order conditions (FOC) of payo¤ maximization:
We showed that FOC hold with equality for all agents and so (2.12) yields (2.10). Thus if payo¤s are non negative at (2.10) this is indeed an equilibrium. And the condition for this is (2.9).
We now study how equilibrium e¤ort changes when we pass from a small contest with n agents to a large contest with kn contestants and and s do not change. 3 This is because and s are the two parameters that are relevant to determine equilibrium e¤ort, so we keep them constant to isolate the e¤ect on equilibrium e¤ort of aggregating the contests. We assume that an equilibrium exists in both the small and the large contest, which amounts to (2.8) with m = n; kn. Thus, 3 In other words, is the only parameter that changes in order to maintain (2.3).
Proposition 1. The e¤ort of contestant i in the C contest is larger than in the D contests i¤
We have that
14)
15)
and the result follows.
With identical agents Y i = n and condition (2.13) is just s < 1. When agents are not identical a su¢ cient condition for (2.13) is that s < 1 and i values the prize no less than the Y i that would result if all agents were identical. Next we study aggregate e¤ort.
Proposition 2. Suppose 6 = 0. Aggregate e¤ort is larger in the C contest i¤ s < 1.
Proof: From (2.10), aggregate e¤ort is larger in the C contest i¤
And the result follows.
Note that when s = 0 (for example the Tullock contest) the C contest dominates the D contest (as already point out by Warneryd (2001)) 4 . This is because when we aggregate k decentralized contests into a single centralized contests there are two e¤ects. The Competition E¤ect, namely that the C contest has more competitors so individual e¤orts must decrease, and the Prize e¤ect,
namely that the C contest has a larger prize which calls for more e¤ort. When s = 0 the prize e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect. As s increases, e¤ort increases in the C and the D contests, but the impact of s is larger in the D contest because s magni…es the competition e¤ect. We …nd that at s > 1, the competitive e¤ect dominates.
Next consider a planner (or contest organizer) who can adjust parameters s and and wants to maximize e¤ort. 5 Thus we have that: 4 In particular, Warneryd …nds that with identical agents and a generalized Tullock CSF, aggregate e¤ort is larger in C contests than in D contests. This is because he assumes that fi(G) = 0 when Gi = 0 -which implies in our case that (1 )(m 1) = s -and that the CSF is independent of m, which implies = 1 and thus s = 0. 5 A planner interested in minimizing e¤ort will choose = 0. Proposition 3. When valuations can take any value compatible with (2.5) and (2.9), the Tullock CSF maximizes aggregate e¤ort. Any other CSF that maximizes aggregate e¤ort yields identical e¤ort to the Tullock CSF. If the CSF is independent of m the Tullock CSF is the only CSF which maximizes aggregate e¤ort.
Proof: Looking at (2.10) the planner will make (m 1 + s) as large as possible, compatible with the su¢ cient condition of equilibrium (2.9). This condition can be written as We study the winners and losers when we pass from a D contest to a C contest. When e¤ort is a social waste both the social planner and all contestants agree on a contest with = 0 (a pure lottery) in which contestants make zero e¤ort in C and D. But when e¤ort is socially valuable, the wishes of the social planner and the contestants may be opposite because for the contestants the less e¤ort they make the better they are. We now show that when agents have di¤erent valuations it may be possible that the wishes of the social planner and those of a group of agents coincide.
Proposition 5. Suppose 6 = 0 and s 1. Agent i prefers the D contest i¤
If 6 = 0 and s > 1 all contestants prefer the C contest.
Proof: From (2.11) and (2.3), payo¤s are larger in the D contests than in the C contest i¤
which after some manipulations becomes
The left hand side of (2.23) is a convex function with a unique minimum at Y i = n. At this value, the left hand side of (2.23) is (s 1)=k. Thus if s > 1 (2.23) never holds. If s < 1 the inequality holds between the two roots for which the left hand side of (2.23) is zero. These two roots are 
